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APOLOGIES AND REASONABLENESS:
SOME IMPLICATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY FOR TORTS
Jennifer K. Robbennolt*
INTRODUCTION
One does not need to think long about the range of situations that
are addressed by tort law to realize that tort law implicates any num-
ber of questions about human behavior and decision making. What
motivates people to pursue tort claims? How do people determine
whether particular conduct is reasonable? How do people reason
about what factors caused which harms? How do such judgments in-
form determinations of blame and liability? How do cases get settled,
and do less tangible things such as apologies matter? How do people
think about compensation and punishment?'
Some of these questions focus on tort doctrine; others center on
how tort lawsuits are brought, handled, and ultimately resolved. As a
"hub science ' 2 with a particular focus on human behavior, psychology
has much to offer that is useful for understanding these questions.
Some psychological findings-primarily the literature on heuristics
and biases3-have already made their way into discussions of tort law
and are taken into account with increasing frequency. Links between
* Professor of Law and Psychology, University of Illinois.
1. See generally E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDU-
RAL JUSTICE (1988) (addressing the question of how legal actors and observers experience the
procedures used to resolve tort cases, and what effect these procedures have on them); Gary
Blasi & John T. Jost, System Justification Theory and Research: Implications for Law, Legal Ad-
vocacy, and Social Justice, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1119 (2006) (examining what values people desire to
incorporate in the system and how reform of the system occurs); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, John
M. Darley & Robert J. MacCoun, Symbolism and Incommensurability in Civil Sanctioning: Deci-
sion Makers As Goal Managers, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1121 (2003) (discussing how people view
and address emotional harms, as well as how people seek to simultaneously achieve the multiple,
potentially inconsistent goals of tort law (for example, appropriate compensation, deterrence.,
and punishment)).
2. Kevin W. Boyack et al., Mapping the Backbone of Science, 64 SCIENTOMETRICS 351 (2005)
(identifying hub sciences based on relationships and patterns of influence among scientific disci-
plines); John T. Cacioppo, Psychology Is a Hub Science, OBSERVER, Sept. 2007, at 5, 42.
3. The literature on heuristics and biases examines the mental short-cuts that people take in
making complex information manageable. Such short-cuts are often efficient ways to reach ac-
curate decisions, but can sometimes result in systematic errors in judgment. See generally
HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTrUrrIvE JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich et al.
eds., 2002).
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tort questions and other areas of psychology have not been as care-
fully developed. In this Article, I highlight just two examples of the
ways in which psychological research has informed our understanding
of tort law and practice: research on the role of apologies in civil
cases4 and research that has complicated our understanding of the
"reasonable person."'5
II. APOLOGIES AND TORT SUITS
Apologies have played a role in a range of prominent and not so
prominent cases. Kobe Bryant, via his attorneys, offered a public
apology to the woman who accused him of rape.6 The president of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) issued an apology to the
parents of a student who died in an alcohol-related incident on cam-
pus. 7 Corporations such as Ford, Wal-Mart, Continental Airlines, and
McDonald's have apologized to claimants. 8 Doctors and hospitals
have apologized to patients, and some medical schools are starting to
incorporate disclosure and apologies into the curriculum.9
More than two-thirds of the states now provide some form of statu-
tory evidentiary protection for apologetic statements. The reach of
many of these statutes is limited to cases involving healthcare, l0 while
4. See infra Part II.
5. See infra Part I1.
6. See Associated Press, Kobe Bryant's Apology, ESPN, Sept. 2, 2004, http://sports.espn.
go.com/nba/news/story?id=1872928.
7. See Letter from Charles Vest, President, Mass. Inst. Tech., to Mr. and Mrs. Krueger (Sept.
8, 2000), available at http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2000/letter.html.
8. See IAN AYRES, SUPER CRUNCHERS 29-30 (2007) (describing apology experiments by Con-
tinental Airlines); Patti Waldmeir, Ford Goes into the Business of Saying Sorry, FIN. TIMES
(London), Jan. 14, 2001, at 8; Wendy Zellner, Wal-Mart: Why an Apology Made Sense, Bus. WK.,
July 3, 2000, at 65.
9. See Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Medical Error, 467 CLINICAL ORTHOPAEDICS &
RELATED RES. 376, 380 (2009).
10. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2605 (Supp. 2008); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-25-135 (2005);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-184(d) (Supp. 2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4318 (Supp. 2008); D.C.
CODE § 16-2841 (2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-37.1 (Supp. 2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-207
(Supp. 2009); 7 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-1901 (2008); IND. CODE § 34-43.5-1-4 (Supp. 2009); IOWA
CODE § 622.31 (Supp. 2009); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3715.5 (2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
24, § 2907 (Supp. 2009); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-920 (2006); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 26-1-814 (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-1201 (Supp. 2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-
E:4 (2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-4, Rule 413 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-04-12 (Supp. 2009);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.43 (LexisNexis 2005); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-1708.1H (Supp.
2008); OR. REV. STAT. § 677.082 (2008); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-1-190 (Supp. 2007); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS § 19-12-14 (Supp. 2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-422 (2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 1912 (Supp. 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.20:1 (2005); W. VA. CODE § 55-7-11(a)
(2008); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-130 (2009).
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other statutes more broadly encompass all civil cases.1' The statutes
also vary as to the nature of the statements that they cover. For exam-
ple, some statutes make statements that express sympathy for the
other's injuries inadmissible, but allow the admission of statements
that admit responsibility. 12 Other statutes protect a wide range of
statements, specifically making statements that express "fault," "er-
ror," or "mistake" inadmissible. 13 Both legal scholars and psycholo-
gists have begun to explore how apologies influence decision making
in the context of tort litigation. Civil defendants or potential defend-
ants must make decisions about whether to offer an apology, and if
they decide to offer one, they must decide when and in what manner
they should offer it, including what they should say. Apologies or lack
thereof may influence the ways in which claimants understand the
events that caused their injuries. Likewise, apologies or lack of apolo-
gies may influence their decisions about whether to seek legal advice,
whether to file a lawsuit, and whether and for how much to settle a
lawsuit. Lawyers advise their clients about whether to give an apol-
ogy, whether to request an apology, and how to respond to an apol-
ogy. Judges preside over settlement conferences in which apologies
may play a role. Lurking in the background is the possibility that the
decisions of fact finders-judges and juries-may be affected by the
existence of an apology.14
Psychologists have conducted considerable research into the ways
in which apologies may influence perceptions, judgments, and deci-
sion making in a variety of contexts. In particular, apologies have
11. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1160(a) (West 2009); FLA. STAT. § 90.4026(2) (Supp. 2009); HAW. R.
EVID. 409.5 (2007); IND. CODE § 34-43.5-1-4 (Supp. 2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 23D
(2008); Mo. REV. STAT. § 538.229 (2008); TENN. R. EVID. § 409.1 (2009); TEX. CIv. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 18.061 (Vernon 2008); WASH. REV. CODE § 5.66.010(1) (2009).
12. See, e.g., CAL. EvID. CODE § 1160(a) (West 2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4318 (Supp.
2008); D.C. CODE § 16-2841 (2001); FLA. STAT. § 90.4026(2) (Supp. 2009); HAw. R. EVID. 409.5
(2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-207 (Supp. 2009); IND. CODE § 34-43.5-1-4 (Supp. 2009); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13:3715.5 (2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2907 (Supp. 2009); MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-920 (2006); Mo. REV. STAT. § 538.229 (2008); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 27-1201 (Supp. 2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-E: 4 (2009); TENN. R. EVID. § 409.1 (2009);
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 18.061 (Vernon 2008); WASH. REV. CODE § 5.66.010(1)
(2009); W. VA. CODE § 55-7-11(a) (2008).
13. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2605 (Supp. 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-135
(2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-184(d) (Supp. 2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-37.1 (Supp. 2009);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-1-190 (Supp. 2007).
14. See, e.g., Marc T. Boccaccini et al., I Want to Apologize, But I Don't Want Everyone to
Know: A Public Apology As Pretrial Publicity Between a Criminal and Civil Case, 32 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REV. 31 (2008); Brian H. Bornstein et al., The Effects of Defendant Remorse on Mock
Juror Decisions in a Malpractice Case, 20 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 393 (2002); Michael N. O'Malley &
Jerald Greenberg, Sex Differences in Restoring Justice: The Down Payment Effect, 17 J. RES.
PERSONALITY 174 (1983).
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been found to influence the attributions that people make about the
causes of injury-producing behavior. Paradoxically, apologies may
both provide evidence that an offender engaged in a particular behav-
ior,15 and simultaneously alter attributions such that the causes of that
behavior are perceived as being less internal to the offender, less con-
trollable by the offender, and less likely to recur.1 6 In addition, draw-
ing on equity theory, psychologists have explored the possibility that
apologies help to restore a sense of equity to the relationship between
the parties by demonstrating that the offender has also suffered.17
Apologies can also contribute to an experience of justice and re-
spect, 18 and they can shape parties' emotional reactions.' 9 The psy-
chology of reciprocity-that we experience a felt obligation to "try to
repay, in kind, what another person has provided us"20-and the role
15. Such evidence might raise the likelihood of an adverse liability verdict and alter the defen-
dant's settlement position. For literature on the effects of confessions, see, for example, Saul M.
Kassin & Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Confessions: A Review of the Literature and
Issues, 5 PSYCHOL. ScI. PUB. INr. 33 (2004); Saul M. Kassin & Katherine Neumann, On the
Power of Confession Evidence: An Experimental Test of the Fundamental Difference Hypothesis,
21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 469 (1997).
16. See, e.g., Seiji Takaku, The Effects of Apology and Perspective Taking on Interpersonal
Forgiveness: A Dissonance-Attribution Model of Interpersonal Forgiveness, 141 J. Soc. PSYCHOL.
494, 495 (2001). See generally BERNARD WEINER, JUDGMENTS OF RESPONSIBILITY: A FOUNDA-
TION FOR A THEORY OF SOCIAL CONDUCT (1995) (describing an attribution model of emotion
and motivation).
17. See William Austin et al., Equity and the Law: The Effect of a Harmdoer's "Suffering in the
Act" on Liking and Assigned Punishment, 9 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 163
(1976); Dana Bramel et al., An Observer's Reaction to the Suffering of His Enemy, 8 J. PERSON-
ALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 384 (1968); Jerry I. Shaw & James A. McMartin, Perpetrator or Victim?
Effects of Who Suffers in an Automobile Accident on Judgmental Strictness, 3 Soc. BEHAV. &
PERSONALITY 5 (1975); Harry S. Upshaw & Daniel Romer, Punishment for One's Misdeeds As a
Function of Having Suffered from Them, 2 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 162 (1976);
Elaine Walster et al., New Directions in Equity Research, 25 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
151 (1973); see also Bornstein et al., supra note 14; O'Malley & Greenberg, supra note 14.
18. See Dale T. Miller, Disrespect and the Experience of Injustice, 52 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 527,
537-38 (2001); see also Dale T. Miller & Neil Vidmar, The Social Psychology of Punishment
Reactions, in THE JUSTICE MOTIVE IN SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: ADAPTING TO TIMES OF SCARCITY
AND CHANGE 145 (Melvin J. Lerner & Sally C. Lerner eds., 1981); Tom R. Tyler, Procedural
Strategies for Gaining Deference: Increasing Social Harmony or Creating False Consciousness?, in
SOCIAL INFLUENCES ON ETHICAL BEHAVIOR IN ORGANIZATIONS 69 (John M. Darley et al. eds.,
2001).
19. See, e.g., Mark Bennett & Deborah Earwaker, Victims' Response to Apologies: The Effects
of Offender Responsibility and Offense Severity, 134 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 457 (1994); Gregg J. Gold
& Bernard Weiner, Remorse, Confession, Group Identity, and Expectancies About Repeating a
Transgression, 22 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 291 (2000); Ken-ichi Ohbuchi et al., Apology
As Aggression Control: Its Role in Mediating Appraisal of and Response to Harm, 56 J. PERSON-
ALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 219, 221 (1989); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settle-
ment: An Empirical Examination, 102 MICH. L. REV. 460, 462 (2003); Takaku, supra note 16;
Bernard Weiner et al., Public Confession and Forgiveness, 59 J. PERSONALITY 281, 291 (1991).
20. ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 19 (3d ed. 1993).
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of social norms and scripts suggest that when apologies are viewed as
concessions, they may elicit favorable reciprocal responses. 21
Drawing on this rich psychological literature, researchers have dis-
covered much about how apologies influence claimants' litigation de-
cisions. In particular, empirical studies have shown that claimants
profess to want to receive apologies22 and that those who receive apol-
ogies report a lower inclination to seek the assistance of an attorney.23
In addition, despite being more likely to predict that they will win
their lawsuit than claimants who do not receive apologies, 24 claimants
who receive apologies tend to have perceptions and judgments that
are more favorable to the other party,25 tend to moderate their posi-
tions in settlement negotiations, 26 and are more willing to accept a
settlement offer.27
These effects, however, depend on the content of the apology. Full
apologies that accept responsibility for causing the harm result in the
most consistent effects.28 Apologies that convey sympathy for the in-
juries but that do not acknowledge wrongdoing have effects that are
more variable and context dependent; these apologies produce effects
that are similar to but smaller than those produced by full apologies
under some circumstances, but few effects, or even somewhat negative
effects, under others.29 Similarly, offers of repair or promises of for-
21. See Mark Bennett & Christopher Dewberry, "I've Said I'm Sorry, Haven't I?" A Study of
the Identity Implications and Constraints That Apologies Create for Their Recipients, 13 CUR-
RENT PSYCHOL. 10 (1994) (finding a tendency for recipients to accept even an unconvincing
apology); Jane L. Risen & Thomas Gilovich, Target and Observer Differences in the Acceptance
of Questionable Apologies, 92 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 418 (2007) (same).
22. See Thomas H. Gallagher et al., Patients' and Physicians' Attitudes Regarding the Disclo-
sure of Medical Errors, 289 JAMA 1001 (2003); Gerald B. Hickson et al., Factors That Prompted
Families to File Medical Malpractice Claims Following Perinatal Injuries, 267 JAMA 1359 (1992);
Kathleen M. Mazor et al., Health Plan Members' Views About Disclosure of Medical Errors, 140
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 409 (2004); Charles Vincent et al., Why Do People Sue Doctors? A
Study of Patients and Relatives Taking Legal Action, 343 LANCET 1609 (1994); Amy B. Witman et
al., How Do Patients Want Physicians to Handle Mistakes? A Survey of Internal Medicine Patients
in an Academic Setting, 156 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2565 (1996).
23. See Mazor et al., supra note 22; Kathleen M. Mazor et al., Disclosure of Medical Errors:
What Factors Influence How Patients Respond?, 21 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 704 (2006).
24. See Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Settlement Levers, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
SrUD. 333 (2006).
25. See Robbennolt, supra note 19, at 462; Robbennolt, supra note 24, at 341-42.
26. See Robbennolt, supra note 24, at 353-56, 362-63.
27. See Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An
Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107, 109-10 (1994); Robbennolt, supra note 19, at
485-86.
28. See Robbennolt, supra note 19; Robbennolt, supra note 24.
29. Robbennolt, supra note 19; Robbennolt, supra note 24.
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bearance can make apologies more effective. 30 In addition, contextual
factors such as the severity of the injury experienced, 31 the type of
violation, 32 and evidence about what led to the injury33 can have an
effect on how an apology is understood. The timing and other charac-
teristics of an apology can also influence its effectiveness.34
Research has also explored the ways in which attorneys respond to
apologies in the context of litigation. There is evidence that although
attorneys understand the messages communicated by apologies in
much the same way as do claimants, apologies differently affect attor-
neys' decision making.35 In particular, while apologies have been
shown to decrease lay people's aspirations and estimates of fair settle-
ment value under some circumstances, apologies tend to increase the
aspirations and fair settlement estimates of attorneys. 36 Such differ-
ences can complicate the ways in which attorneys represent clients
and negotiate settlements in tort lawsuits.
We know significantly less about how defendants decide whether
and how to apologize. Physicians have been the most widely studied
potential defendants. Studies of physicians have found that many
physicians express a desire to apologize to patients when an error has
occurred,37 but these same studies have also found that physicians are
30. See Steven J. Scher & John M. Darley, How Effective Are the Things People Say to Apolo-
gize? Effects of the Realization of the Apology Speech Act, 26 J. PSYCHOLINGUISTIC RES. 127,
134-36 (1997); Manfred Schmitt et al., Effects of Objective and Subjective Account Components
on Forgiving, 144 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 465, 480 (2004). The notion that appropriate compensation
is relevant to understanding apologies has been articulated by Bishop Desmond Tutu: "If you
take my pen and say you are sorry, but don't give me the pen back, nothing has happened."
NANCY BERLINGER, AFTER HARM: MEDICAL ERROR AND THE ETHICS OF FORGIVENESS 61
(2005).
31. See Ken-ichi Ohbuchi et al., Apology As Aggression Control: Its Role in Mediating Ap-
praisal of and Response to Harm, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 219 (1989); Robbennolt,
supra note 19; Robbennolt, supra note 24; Barry R. Schlenker & Bruce W. Darby, The Use of
Apologies in Social Predicaments, 44 Soc. PSYCHOL. 0. 271 (1981).
32. See Peter H. Kim et al., Removing the Shadow of Suspicion: The Effects of Apology Versus
Denial for Repairing Competence- Versus Integrity-Based Trust Violations, 89 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 104 (2004).
33. See Robbennolt, supra note 19; Robbennolt, supra note 24.
34. See, e.g., Cynthia McPherson Frantz & Courtney Bennigson, Better Late Than Early: The
Influence of Timing on Apology Effectiveness, 41 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 201 (2005).
35. See Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Attorneys, Apologies, and Settlement Negotiation, 13 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 349 (2008).
36. Id. at 351. Additionally, judges may respond differently than either claimants or attor-
neys. See Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Settlement, 45 CT. REv. (forthcoming 2010);
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Do Apologies Affect Trial Judges? (Oct. 2009) (unpublished manu-
script on file with author).
37. See Gallagher et al., supra note 22.
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reluctant to conclude that error has occurred.38 Additional studies
have found that, despite a wide variation in actual practice, 39 physi-
cians tend to provide minimal information, to choose their words care-
fully, to believe that patients who want more information will ask for
it,4 and to wait to make any offer of compensation unless and until a
lawsuit is filed. 41 Research that explores how these tendencies play
out in the decision-making processes of defendants and their counsel,
as well as the factors underlying these tendencies, would provide wel-
come insight into how apologies operate in litigation contexts. In ad-
dition, research that examines the ways in which apologizing
influences defendants' approach to bargaining would be useful.
Similarly, we know very little about how the rules of evidence that
protect different kinds of apologies may affect the defendant's deci-
sion to make an apology. Proponents often argue that providing evi-
dentiary protection will allow defendants to apologize safely,
concluding that more apologies will be offered as a consequence. 42
Indeed, defendants tend to cite fear of litigation or liability as the pri-
mary barrier to offering apologies. 43 However, there are a variety of
other potential impediments to offering apologies, including cognitive
dissonance, loss aversion, embarrassment, and uncertainty about how
to offer an apology.44 As Nancy Berlinger has noted, "[M]erely pro-
38. See PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY, MAL-
PRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 125 (1993).
39. Compare David K. Chan et al., How Surgeons Disclose Medical Error to Patients: A Study
Using Standardized Patients, 138 SURGERY 851 (2005) (finding that forty-seven percent of sur-
geons surveyed offered some expression of apology or regret to the patient; these expressions
ranged from explicit apologies for the error to much less direct statements of regret, such as "I'm
sorry to have to tell you this"), with Thomas H. Gallagher et al., Choosing Your Words Carefully:
How Physicians Would Disclose Harmful Medical Errors to Patients, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL
MED. 1585 (2006) (finding across a range of scenarios that six percent of physician respondents
indicated that they would not offer any apology, sixty-one percent indicated that they would only
express sympathy, and thirty-three percent claimed that they would give an explicit apology
acknowledging the error).
40. See Gallagher, supra note 22, at 1004.
41. See ATUL GAWANDE, BETTER: A SURGEON'S NOTES ON PERFORMANCE 101 (2007); David
A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice Litigation and Tort Reform: It's the Incentives,
Stupid, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1085, 1122 (2006); Philip G. Peters, Jr., What We Know About Mal-
practice Settlements, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1783, 1828 (2007).
42. See Jonathan R. Cohen, Legislating Apology: The Pros and Cons, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 819
(2002).
43. See Gallagher et al., supra note 22, at 1003; Rae M. Lamb et al., Hospital Disclosure Prac-
tices: Results of a National Study, 22 HEALTH AFn. 73, 76 (2003); see also Stephan Landsman,
Reflections on Juryphobia and Medical Malpractice Reform, in CIVIL JURIES AND CIVIL JUSTICE:
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 151 (Brian H. Borstein et al., eds. 2008) (exploring
"juryphobia" as a source of these fears).
44. See generally CAROL TAVRIS & ELLIOT ARONSON, MISTAKES WERE MADE (BUT NOT BY
ME) (2007); Cohen, supra note 42, at 1023-24, 1042-46 (detailing obstacles to apologies in the
2010]
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tecting apologies is not the same as encouraging them. Genuine apol-
ogies are never fun to make. '45 It remains to be seen how evidentiary
protection for apologies will influence the complex decisions that de-
fendants make about whether and how to apologize.
Critics of evidentiary protection for apologies raise concerns about
the extent to which legal protection for apologies diminishes their
moral value.46 To date, experimental studies have failed to find that
recipients discount the value of apologies that are inadmissible. 47
There is, however, some evidence that drawing attention to or ex-
plaining a lack of evidentiary protection-that is, making the legal
risks of an apology salient-may provide those who desire an apology
with an explanation for the other party's failure to apologize com-
pletely. In one study, when claimants were told that the legal rules did
not protect the opposing party's apology, the claimants made more
positive assessments of offenders who did not apologize or who of-
fered only a partial apology than did those claimants who were told
that apologies were protected or who were not given any information
about the relevant evidentiary rule.48 Thus, the effects of protective
statutes on how apologies will be interpreted by claimants may be
complex and could even change over time.
Even with as much as we have discovered about the role of apolo-
gies in tort cases, there are still many open research questions. What
effect does the type of wrong have on how apologies are understood?
Will claimants become increasingly skeptical of apologies offered in
litigation? How might factors such as tone of voice, non-verbal ges-
tures, or facial expressions moderate the effects of apologies? How
do people evaluate apologies that are negotiated as part of a settle-
ment agreement or that are offered post-settlement? Empirical an-
swers to these questions and others will help to better inform practice
and policy.
legal context). For a discussion of barriers to apologies by physicians, see Thomas H. Gallagher
et al., US and Canadian Physicians' Attitudes and Experiences Regarding Disclosing Errors to
Patients, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1605 (2006); Lauris C. Kaldjian et al., An Empirically
Derived Taxonomy of Factors Affecting Physicians' Willingness to Disclose Medical Errors, 21 J.
GEN. INTERNAL MED. 942 (2006).
45. BERLINGER, supra note 30, at 62.
46. See Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135
(2000).
47. See Robbennolt, supra note 19, at 499-500, 502; Robbennolt, supra note 24.
48. See Robbennolt, supra note 24, at 360.
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III. PSYCHOLOGY AND TORT DOcTRINE: THE
REASONABLE PERSON
In addition to the implications of psychology for tort settlement,
psychology has also contributed to analyses of tort doctrine. Perhaps
not surprisingly, psychology has important implications for under-
standing the figure at the center of negligence law: the "reasonable
person. ' 49 Many determinations in tort are to be made with reference
to a standard of "reasonableness. '50 In particular, whether a person
has acted negligently depends on whether she acted with "reasonable
care under all the circumstances."' 51 Factors thought to be relevant to
this analysis include "the foreseeable likelihood that the person's con-
duct will result in harm, the foreseeable severity of any harm that may
ensue, and the burden of precautions to eliminate or reduce the risk of
harm." 52
A. Judging the Reasonable Person in Hindsight
Importantly, determinations of whether particular conduct is rea-
sonable are to be made from an ex ante perspective, judging the rea-
sonableness of the conduct before the consequences of the chosen
action were known. As Prosser and Keeton note,
The actor's conduct must be judged in the light of the possibilities
apparent to him at the time, and not by looking backward "with the
wisdom born of the event." The standard is one of conduct, rather
than of consequences. It is not enough that everyone can see now
that the risk was great, if it was not apparent when the conduct
occurred. 53
49. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of
Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 634-35 (1999) ("[A]ny legal concept that relies in
some sense on a notion of reasonableness or that is premised on the existence of a reasonable or
rational decisionmaker will need to be reassessed in light of the mounting evidence that a human
is 'a reasoning rather than a reasonable animal."'); see also Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The
Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1,
136-37 (2004).
50. For example, whether contact is offensive is judged by whether it offends a reasonable
sense of personal dignity, and defense of self or others with reasonable force is allowed when
one reasonably believes that another is about to inflict harmful or offensive contact. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 18, 63 (1965).
51. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm § 3 (Apr. 6, 2005) (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1).
52. Id.
53. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 31 (5th ed.
1984); see also Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm § 3 cmt. g (Apr. 6,
2005) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1) ("[I]t is not enough that there be a likelihood of harm; the
likelihood must be foreseeable to the actor at the time of the conduct.").
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In negligence 'cases it is not enough that genuine harm has been suf-
fered by a claimant. Among other things, the finder of fact must con-
sider what harms were foreseeable, 54 the likelihood that the harms
would result, the likely severity of the harms, and the extent to which
precautions could lessen the risk of harm.
While the law is clear that negligence should be assessed from an ex
ante perspective, research in psychology has demonstrated that people
have difficulty taking an ex ante perspective when making ex post
judgments. In particular, the hindsight bias makes it difficult to assess
the predictions that one would have made in foresight.55 Once a sce-
nario has unfolded, it is common to experience a feeling that one
"knew [it] all along. '' 56 When outcome information is known, other
information about the event can be re-construed in light of the out-
come, creating an integrated picture of the event and its outcome that
is hard to disentangle.57 The hindsight bias occurs when people-at-
tempting to recreate a prospective estimate of the likelihood of a par-
ticular outcome in hindsight-assign a higher probability to that
outcome than do those making similar estimates in foresight. 58 Of
particular importance for tort law, people "not only tend to view what
has happened as having been inevitable, but also to view it as having
appeared 'relatively inevitable' before it happened. People believe
54. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm § 3 cmt. h (Apr. 6, 2005)
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1) ("The harm whose severity should be considered under this Sec-
tion is not the particular harm suffered by the plaintiff, but whatever harms are rendered more
likely by the actor's conduct. There may well be a range of foreseeable harms .... ").
55. See Scott A. Hawkins & Reid Hastie, Hindsight: Biased Judgments of Past Events After the
Outcomes Are Known, 107 PSYCHOL. BULL. 311 (1990).
56. Id. at 311.
57. Id.
58. For example, in one of the initial studies demonstrating this effect, respondents were pro-
vided with materials that described a war between the British and the Gurkas of Nepal, the
strengths and weaknesses of each side, and four possible outcomes. Different groups of respon-
dents were told that the conflict had resulted in one of the four different outcomes; a fifth group
was given no outcome information. Each respondent then estimated the probability of the oc-
currence of each possible outcome. Respondents who had been told that a particular outcome
had occurred inflated the probability of that outcome occurring as compared to the probability
assigned by respondents before receiving the information. See Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight #
Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMEN-
TAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288, 289 (1975). See generally Fischhoff,
supra; Baruch Fischhoff & Ruth Beyth, "I Knew It Would Happen": Remembered Probabilities
of Once-Future Things, 13 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 1 (1975). For reviews of the
literature, see Jay J.J. Christensen-Szalanski & Cynthia Fobian Willham, The Hindsight Bias: A
Meta-Analysis, 48 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 147 (1991); Rebecca L. Guilbault
et al., A Meta-Analysis of Research on Hindsight Bias, 26 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 103
(2004); Hawkins & Hastie, supra note 55; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory
of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998).
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that others should have been able to anticipate events much better
than was actually the case." 59
A related phenomenon, the outcome bias, occurs when people
judge the quality of a decision based on its outcome. For example,
decisions resulting in negative consequences are judged to have been
bad decisions. 60 Thus, when people were given information about the
risks and benefits related to a medical treatment decision, they judged
the quality of the same decision more favorably when the treatment
turned out to be successful than when it did not.61
Hindsight and outcome biases have been demonstrated in a variety
of domains, including judgments about historical and political
events, 62 clinical predictions and diagnoses, 63 and judgments about
business and financial decisions.64 Such biases have implications for
the types of judgments and decisions required of experts and fact find-
ers in tort cases.65 A legal decision maker who is asked to evaluate
59. Baruch Fischhoff, Debiasing, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BI-
ASES 422, 428 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (emphasis added).
60. See Jonathan Baron & John C. Hershey, Outcome Bias in Decision Evaluation, 54 J. PER-
SONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 569, 570 (1988) (observing that while hindsight bias and outcome
bias may produce similar results and may often work in tandem, the outcome bias is a distinct
bias that is distinguishable from the hindsight bias).
61. Id. at 571-72.
62. See, e.g., Fred B. Bryant & Jennifer Howard Brockway, Hindsight Bias in Reaction to the
Verdict in the O.J. Simpson Criminal Trial, 19 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 225 (1997); Fred
B. Bryant & Rebecca L. Guilbault, "I Knew It All Along" Eventually: The Development of Hind-
sight Bias in Reaction to the Clinton Impeachment Verdict, 24 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL.
27 (2002); Fischhoff, supra note 58, at 428; Fischhoff & Beyth, supra note 58 (examining hind-
sight bias in the context of Nixon's visit to China and the Soviet Union); Lee J. Gilbertson et al.,
A Study of Hindsight Bias: The Rodney King Case in Retrospect, 74 PSYCHOL. REP. 383 (1994);
Mark R. Leary, Hindsight Distortion and the 1980 Presidential Election, 8 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 257 (1982).
63. See, e.g., Hal R. Arkes et al., Hindsight Bias Among Physicians Weighing the Likelihood of
Diagnoses, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 252 (1981); Baron & Hershey, supra note 60; Neal V. Daw-
son et al., Hindsight Bias: An Impediment to Accurate Probability Estimation in Clinicopatho-
logic Conferences, 8 MED. DECISION MAKING 259 (1988).
64. See, e.g., Clifton E. Brown & Ira Solomon, Effects of Outcome Information on Evaluations
of Managerial Decisions, 62 Accr. REV. 564 (1987); Thomas A. Buchman, An Effect of Hind-
sight on Predicting Bankruptcy with Accounting Information, 10 Accr. ORG. & Soc'Y 267
(1985). The hindsight bias has also been shown to affect judgments of visual material. See
Daniel M. Bernstein et al., We Saw It All Along: Visual Hindsight Bias in Children and Adults, 15
PSYCHOL. ScL. 264 (2004); Erin M. Harley et al., The "Saw It All Along" Effect: Demonstrations
of Visual Hindsight Bias, 30 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING MEMORY & COGNITION 960
(2004). Such visual hindsight bias has implications for judgments in legal cases as well, including
expert review of medical images. See Erin M. Harley, Hindsight Bias in Legal Decision Making,
25 Soc. COGrroN 48 (2007) (reviewing studies).
65. The effects of hindsight and outcome bias are not limited to laypeople, but have also been
found to affect the judgments of judges and other experts. See, e.g., John C. Anderson et al.,
Evaluation of Auditor Decisions: Hindsight Bias Effects and the Expectation Gap, 14 J. ECON.
PSYCHOL. 711 (1993); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777
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the reasonableness of particular conduct will know that harm has in
fact occurred. Hindsight and outcome biases are likely to affect judg-
ments about the range of risks that were foreseeable, whether a par-
ticular risk was foreseeable, the likelihood that a particular risk would
materialize, and estimates of the likely severity of harm. The risk of
loss is likely to seem significant and any precautions taken are likely
to seem less reasonable.
Experimental studies that have explored the hindsight bias in the
context of tort litigation generally support these predictions. 66 For ex-
ample, Susan LaBine and Gary LaBine compared judgments about
therapists' assessments of patient dangerousness in foresight and hind-
sight across six different scenarios. 67 When mock jurors were told that
the patient became violent, they rated the actions taken by the thera-
pist as being less reasonable, were more likely to believe that the ther-
apist should have done more, thought that the violence was more
foreseeable, and were more likely to predict that they would have pre-
dicted violence themselves than did mock jurors who did not have this
hindsight information. 68 Ultimately, mock jurors were more likely to
find that the therapist was negligent when they were told that a vio-
lent outcome had occurred (24% of mock jurors) than when no vio-
lence resulted (6% of mock jurors) or when the outcome was not
specified (9% of mock jurors).69
Kim Kamin and Jeff Rachlinski obtained similar results using a sce-
nario involving whether a city should have taken precautions to pre-
vent flooding.70 Participants who judged the decision in hindsight
(2001); see also Guilbault et al., supra note 58, at 112, 115 (finding no differences between ex-
perts and nonexperts).
66. Hindsight bias has also been explored in other legal contexts, including judgments relating
to the propriety of searches and seizures. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Casper et al., Juror Decision
Making, Attitudes, and the Hindsight Bias, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 291 (1989); Jonathan D.
Casper et al., Cognitions, Attitudes, and Decision-Making in Search and Seizure Cases, 18 J. AP-
PLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 93 (1988); Dorothy K. Kagehiro et al., Hindsight Bias and Third-Party
Consentors to Warrantless Police Searches, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 305 (1991); Jennifer K. Rob-
bennolt & Mark S. Sobus, An Integration of Hindsight Bias and Counterfactual Thinking: Deci-
sion-Making and Drug Courier Profiles, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 539 (1997).
67. See Susan J. LaBine & Gary LaBine, Determinations of Negligence and the Hindsight Bias,
20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 501 (1996).
68. Id. at 507-09.
69. Id. at 510. Despite the overall shift in assessment, post-event and pre-outcome judgments
do tend to be influenced by the same types of factors, including the severity of risked outcome
(potential harm) and the level of precautions taken. See Marylie Karlovac & John M. Darley,
Attribution of Responsibility for Accidents: A Negligence Law Analogy, 6 Soc. COGNITION 287
(1988).
70. See Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post # Ex Ante: Determining Liability in
Hindsight, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89 (1995) (using a scenario based on Petition of Kinsman
Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964)).
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made higher estimates of the probability of flooding than did those
judging in foresight. 71 In addition, only 24% of those judging in fore-
sight thought that the precaution ought to have been taken, while
57% of those judging in hindsight indicated that the failure to take the
precaution was negligent.72 Similar results have been found for hind-
sight judgments assessing medical diagnoses and auditor
performance. 73
Concern about the effects of the hindsight bias in tort litigation has
sparked much discussion. The hindsight bias has proven to be difficult
to overcome, and those techniques that appear to hold some promise
are not easily adapted to the contours of the legal system.74 There-
fore, some scholars have looked to a variety of other mechanisms that
are directed at counteracting the bias, such as bifurcating trials75 or
otherwise structuring proceedings so that fact finders do not know the
consequences of the decision or conduct at issue,76 using a clear and
convincing standard, 77 introducing increased reliance on strict liability
71. Id. at 98-99.
72. Id. at 98.
73. For example, physicians asked to estimate the probability of particular diagnoses being
correct given a patient's symptoms either before or after learning the pathologic diagnosis dis-
play the hindsight bias, assigning higher probabilities to the correct diagnosis in hindsight than
they did in foresight. See Arkes et al., supra note 63; Dawson et al., supra note 63. Similarly,
several studies of the evaluation of auditor performance have found that auditor decision mak-
ing is judged more harshly when the audit is followed by a negative outcome. See, e.g., Ander-
son et al., supra note 65; D. Jordan Lowe & Philip M.J. Reckers, The Effects of Hindsight Bias on
Jurors' Evaluations of Auditor Decisions, 25 DECISION Sci. 401 (1994). Hindsight bias has also
been shown to influence judgments about whether or not punitive damages are appropriate. See
Reid Hastie et al., Juror Judgments in Civil Cases: Hindsight Effects on Judgments of Liability for
Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 597 (1999).
74. See, e.g., Hal R. Arkes et al., Eliminating the Hindsight Bias, 73 J. App. PSYCHOL. 305
(1988); Martin F. Davies, Reduction of Hindsight Bias by Restoration of Foresight Perspective:
Effectiveness of Foresight-Encoding and Hindsight-Retrieval Strategies, 40 ORG. BEHAV. & HUm.
DECISION PROCESSES 50 (1987); Kamin & Rachlinski, supra note 70; Lowe & Reckers, supra
note 73; Michelle R. Nario & Nyla R. Branscombe, Comparison Processes in Hindsight and
Causal Attribution, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1244 (1995); Paul Slovic & Baruch
Fischhoff, On the Psychology of Experimental Surprises, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUm.
PERCEPrION & PERFORMANCE 544 (1977); Merrie Jo Stallard & Debra L. Worthington, Reduc-
ing the Hindsight Bias Utilizing Attorney Closing Arguments, 22 LAW & HUm. BEHAV. 671
(1998).
75. See Hal R. Arkes & Cindy A. Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. the Business Judgment
Rule: Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L. REV. 587, 633-36 (1994); David B. Wexler &
Robert F. Schopp, How and When to Correct for Juror Hindsight Bias in Mental Health Malprac-
tice Litigation: Some Preliminary Observations, 7 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 485, 489-90, 493-96 (1989).
76. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1471, 1527-29 (1998).
77. Id. at 1530-1532.
2010]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
or the regulatory system,78 or allowing for increased deference to cus-
tom or practice guidelines. 79 Others have been more cautious, argu-
ing that various aspects of the current system may work to minimize,
counter, or offset any effects that the bias might have.80
Recent work on the hindsight bias by psychologists has focused on
exploring the mechanisms that underlie the effect, ways in which to
attenuate the effect, and the nature of boundary conditions on or
moderators of the effect. 81 While the hindsight bias is relatively resis-
tant to debiasing,82 some moderators of the hindsight effect suggest
that the effect might be somewhat weaker in the kinds of situations
that result in tort lawsuits. For example, while an earlier review sug-
gested that negative outcomes resulted in stronger hindsight effects,83
a recent meta-analysis found that negative outcomes result in weaker
hindsight effects than do neutral outcomes. 84 In addition, studies ex-
amining real world and case histories have found weaker hindsight
effects than have studies exploring the effect in the context of factual
knowledge questions. 85 Similarly, tasks that require subjective assess-
ments of the probability of risk tend to find weaker hindsight effects
than those that require objective probability estimates. 86 Given that
tort lawsuits tend to involve real world case scenarios that have re-
sulted in negative outcomes, and that fact finders are not required to
provide numerical probability estimates, we might expect somewhat
attenuated hindsight effects in evaluations of legal cases.
Other recent studies have investigated some boundary conditions
on the hindsight bias and even some circumstances in which the effect
might be reversed. For example, in one recent study, Neal Roese and
his colleagues explored the extent to which courtroom computer ani-
78. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1053, 1098-1100 (2000).
79. See Arkes & Schipani, supra note 75, at 597-601; Rachlinski, supra note 58, at 574,
607-613.
80. See, e.g., Philip G. Peters, Hindsight Bias and Tort Liability: Avoiding Premature Conclu-
sions, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1277 (1999); Rachlinski, supra note 58; see also John E. Montgomery,
Cognitive Biases and Heuristics in Tort Litigation: A Proposal to Limit Their Effects Without
Changing the World, 85 NEB. L. REV. 15 (2006). The Reporter's Note to Restatement (Third) of
Torts § 3 notes that "if there is such a [hindsight] bias, it is one that the negligence system evi-
dently finds generally acceptable." Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm § 3
cmt. g (Apr. 6, 2005) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1).
81. See Guilbault et al., supra note 58.
82. Id. at 110.
83. See Christensen-Szalanski & Fobian Willham, supra note 58.
84. See Guilbault et al., supra note 58, at 110 (finding that positive outcomes produced weaker
effects than neutral outcomes).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 113.
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mation might have implications for the hindsight bias.87 One possibil-
ity is that computer animation might serve to increase hindsight bias.
This might occur because "the clarity of visual presentation" depicting
the outcome makes the information easier to process and points to a
"coherent causal explanation" for the outcome that is difficult to dis-
count.88 At the same time, however, the psychology of representa-
tional momentum and intuitive physics suggests that the hindsight bias
might be reversed under conditions in which the perception of motion
triggers strong lay intuitions about future trajectory.89 In such cases,
foresight estimates might be even greater than hindsight estimates.90
Using two different accident scenarios, Roese and his colleagues va-
ried the presence or absence of a computer animated accident recrea-
tion and varied the point at which the animation sequence ended.91
When the accident was portrayed via computer animation, foresight
participants who saw a recreation that stopped just after the negligent
act made estimates of the likelihood of a serious accident that were
significantly higher than the estimates of hindsight participants. 92 In
other words, "[pleople became hyperconfident of impending events
that involved motion and trajectory, giving higher likelihood estimates
for an outcome that might happen than for an outcome they had actu-
ally seen."' 93 The authors suggest that this propensity effect could also
"be related to the tendency of drivers both to underestimate the time
remaining before a vehicle collision ... and to 'give-up' (i.e., cease
active attempts at avoidance) when a collision seems imminent. ' 94 In
addition, these findings hint that judging conduct in hindsight is more
complex than has been previously recognized, with aspects of fact
finder cognition interacting with features of the legal system to influ-
ence judgment.
B. Judging the Reasonable Person's Cognitive Abilities
Similar problems can arise when fact finders are asked to make
judgments about the cognitive abilities of others. The law contem-
plates that decision makers "can simply consider whether the reasona-
bly careful person would have been aware of the risk. For example,
87. Neal J. Roese et al., The Propensity Effect: When Foresight Trumps Hindsight, 17
PSYCHOL. Sci. 305 (2006).
88. Id. at 305.
89. Id. at 306.
90. Id.
91. The study used computer animation that had been prepared for trials. Id.
92. Id. at 307.
93. Id. at 308.
94. Id. (citations omitted).
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the jury can determine whether a pedestrian should have detected,
and hence avoided stumbling over, a banana peel located on a
crowded sidewalk. ' 95 However, research into the psychology of meta-
cognition-people's intuitive understanding of their own and others'
cognitive abilities-raises the possibility that fact finders will have dif-
ficulty in making these judgments in some instances. As Jeff Rach-
linksi has noted,
If lay intuition suggests people can see things that most people actu-
ally fail to see, hear sounds that most people actually cannot hear,
attend to stimuli that most people actually miss and remember
events that most people actually forget, then the reasonable person
is actually a superhero; ordinary people cannot conform their con-
duct to the entity endowed with these abilities.96
To take just one set of examples, research in psychology has demon-
strated that people can suffer from inattentional blindness (that is,
failure to notice objects) and change blindness (that is, failure to no-
tice even substantial changes in objects or scenes) when their atten-
tion is otherwise engaged. 97 In one series of studies, participants were
asked to watch two teams of three basketball players and to keep
track of the players' passes.98 When participants' attention was fo-
cused in this way, nearly half failed to notice a person in a gorilla
costume or a person with an open umbrella walk through the game.99
In another study, people engaged in conversation about directions
failed to notice that they were talking to a different person after their
conversation was interrupted as two people carrying a door passed
between them.100 In still other studies, people watching filmed con-
versations failed to detect changes in the color of the speakers' plates,
changes in whether one speaker was wearing a colorful scarf or not,
and changes in the identity of the speakers. 01
95. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm (Basic Principles) § 3, cmt. k
(Mar. 28, 2001) (Tentative Draft No. 1).
96. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Misunderstanding Ability, Misallocating Responsibility, 68 BROOK. L.
REV. 1055, 1057 (2003).
97. See generally ARIEN MACK & IRVIN ROCK, INATrENTIONAL BLINDNESS (1998); Daniel J.
Simons & Daniel T. Levin, Change Blindness, 1 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCi. 261 (1997); Daniel J.
Simons & Ronald A. Rensink, Change Blindness: Past, Present, and Future, 9 TRENDS COGNI-
TIVE SCL 16 (2005).
98. See Daniel J. Simons & Christopher F. Chabris, Gorillas in Our Midst: Sustained Inatten-
tional Blindness for Dynamic Events, 28 PERCEPTION 1059, 1062 (1999).
99. Id. at 1068.
100. See Daniel J. Simons & Daniel T. Levin, Failure to Detect Changes to People in a Real-
World Interaction, 5 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 644 (1998); see also Daniel J. Simons, Current
Approaches to Change Blindness, 7 VISUAL COGNITION 1, 5 (2000).
101. See Daniel T. Levin & Daniel J. Simons, Failure to Detect Changes to Attended Objects in
Motion Pictures, 4 PSYCHONOMic BULL. & REV. 501, 502-03 (1997).
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Importantly, for purposes of a tort system that relies on fact finders
to make judgments about the reasonableness of conduct, people often
incorrectly predict that they would be able to detect such changes.
For example, in one study, 83% of participants predicted they would
detect changes that only 11% of participants in previous studies had
actually detected. 10 2 This phenomenon has been described as change
blindness blindness.10 3
If judges and jurors believe that particular perceptual details or
changes in an environment are relatively easily detected, it is likely
that such beliefs will impact their evaluations of the reasonableness of
a defendant's or plaintiff's conduct.1°4 For example, it would not be
surprising if assessments of people's general ability to detect a banana
peel on the sidewalk affect their judgments about the reasonableness
of an actor who fails to avoid such a banana peel. Similarly, such mis-
perceptions could also impact actors' ability to accurately judge their
own abilities, with such overconfidence leading to "unreasonable" be-
havior. 10 5 Even if we ultimately determine that these possibilities do
not warrant significant legal reform,10 6 inquiry into the nature of such
effects, their boundaries, and the implications for legal decision mak-
ing can help to further our understanding of decisions regarding
"reasonableness."
102. See Daniel T. Levin et al., Change Blindness Blindness: The Metacognitive Error of Over-
estimating Change-Detection Ability, 7 VISUAL COGNITION 397, 401 (2000).
103. Id. at 398.
104. However, as Jeff Rachlinski has noted, "Although psychologists have conducted numer-
ous experiments to identify misperceptions about cognitive abilities, no one has yet clearly
demonstrated that these misperceptions lead to mistaken assignments of blame." Rachlinski,
supra note 96, at 1074.
105. See David A. Armor & Shelley E. Taylor, When Predictions Fail: The Dilemma of Unreal-
istic Optimism, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 334, 334
(Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002); see also Jolls et al., supra note 76; Korobkin & Ulen, supra
note 78; Donald C. Langevoort, Ego, Human Behavior, and Law, 51 VA. L. REV. 853 (1995).
Other work in psychology has demonstrated a "bias blind spot" such that individuals are willing
to believe that psychological biases and other phenomena occur in others, but not in themselves.
See, e.g., Joyce Ehrlinger et al., Peering into the Bias Blind Spot: People's Assessments of Bias in
Themselves and Others, 31 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 680, 689 (2005); Justin Kruger
& Thomas Gilovich, "Naive Cynicism" in Everyday Theories of Responsibility Assessment: On
Biased Assumptions of Bias, 76 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 743, 751 (1999); Emily Pronin
et al., Objectivity in the Eye of the Beholder: Divergent Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others,
111 PSYCHOL. REV. 781, 793 (2004).
106. See Rachlinski, supra note 96, at 1083-84 (arguing that various existing legal doctrines-
such as bright line rules, negligence per se, and comparative negligence-might "blunt" the ef-
fects of this kind of misjudgment).
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C. Judging Other Aspects of the Reasonable Person
Hindsight bias and other phenomena, such as change blindness
blindness, have interesting implications for how people judge whether
particular conduct comports with the standard of reasonable care.
While the implications for determinations of reasonableness of these
aspects of psychology-particularly hindsight bias-have been widely
discussed, exploration of the implications of other aspects of psychol-
ogy for our understanding of the reasonable person standard has only
just begun. For example, psychology still has much to contribute to an
understanding of the reasonable person standard with regard to the
ways in which the reasonableness of corporate actors is assessed; 10 7
the role of scripts in determining and evaluating behavior; 08 the ef-
fects of omission bias,109 betrayal aversion, 110 outcome severity,' and
emotion 1 2 on judgments of reasonableness; the implications of plural-
istic ignorance, 13 false consensus,114 and normality bias 1 5 for assess-
ments of custom; the implications of counterfactual thinking for the
107. See VALERIE P. HANS, BUSINESS ON TRIAL: THE CIVIL JURY AND CORPORATE RESPON-
SIBILITY 112-23 (2000).
108. See, e.g., Paul Heald, Mindlessness and Nondurable Precuations, 27 GA. L. REV. 673
(1993). See generally Robert P. Abelson, Psychological Status of the Script Concept, 36 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 715 (1981).
109. See Jonathan Baron & Ilana Ritov, Reference Points and Omission Bias, 59 ORGANIZA-
TIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 475 (1994).
110. See generally Jonathan J. Koehler & Andrew D. Gershoff, Betrayal Aversion: When
Agents of Protection Become Agents of Harm, 90 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 244 (2003).
111. See generally Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Outcome Severity and Judgments of "Responsibil-
ity": A Meta-Analytic Review, 30 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2575 (2000).
112. See generally Paul Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 397 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002); Paul Slovic &
Ellen Peters, Risk Perception and Affect, 15 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCL 322 (2006).
113. Pluralistic ignorance occurs when "individuals mistakenly assume that their beliefs, per-
ceptions, and feelings differ from those of their peers." Dale T. Miller & Deborah A. Prentice,
Collective Errors and Errors About the Collective, 20 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 541
(1994). See generally Deborah A. Prentice & Dale T. Miller, Pluralistic Ignorance and the Per-
petuation of Social Norms by Unwitting Actors, in 28 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL.
161 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 1996).
114. False consensus "involves an overestimation of the commonness of one's own responses
and reactions." Emily Pronin et al., Understanding Misunderstanding: Social Psychological Per-
spectives, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 636, 642
(Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002). See generally Lee Ross et al., The "False Consensus Effect":
An Egocentric Bias in Social Perception and Attribution Processes, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 279 (1977); Joachim Krueger, On the Perception of Social Consensus, in 30 ADVANCES
IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 163 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 1998).
115. See Robert A. Prentice & Jonathan J. Koehler, A Normality Bias in Legal Decision Mak-
ing, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 583 (2003).
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tension between standards and rules for reasonableness; 116 the impli-
cations of the representative heuristic for our understanding of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur;117 the ability and willingness of actors to
engage in risk-utility calculations; 18 differences in how people apply a
"reasonable woman," a "reasonable person," or a "reasonable man"
standard;119 the ways in which the presentation of risk information
(for example, as frequencies or probabilities) influences judgments of
likelihood;120 and the ways in which an actor might rationalize tortious
conduct as reasonable.1 21 Some of these areas have received more
attention; others remain relatively unexplored. While this list surely
does not exhaust the ways in which psychological theory can offer in-
sight into our understanding of the reasonable person standard, it
clearly suggests the potential breadth of the relationship.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article focuses on the role of apologies in the settlement of
tort suits and on one central element of a negligence claim-the
breach of a reasonable person standard. But psychology is certainly
relevant to a broad range of settlement issues and to each of the ele-
ments in a prima facie case for negligence, including issues of duty,
causation, scope of liability, and damages.1 22
116. See Adam J. Hirsch & Gregory Mitchell, Law and Proximity, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 557;
see also Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited,
79 OR. L. REV. 23 (2000) (considering the implications of self-serving bias, hindsight bias, availa-
bility, the endowment effect, and norm compliance for standards versus rules).
117. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation, 79
OR. L. REV. 61, 90-93 (2000).
118. See Steven P. Croley, Vicarious Liability in Tort: On the Sources and Limits of Employee
Reasonableness, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1705 (1995); Alan Page Fiske & Philip E. Tetlock, Taboo
Trade-Offs: Reactions to Transactions That Transgress the Spheres of Justice, 18 POL. PSYCHOL.
255, 285-86 (1997); Philip E. Tetlock et al., The Psychology of the Unthinkable: Taboo Trade
Offs, Forbidden Base Rates, and Heretical Counterfactuals, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
853 (2000); Thomas S. Ulen, Rational Victims-Rational Injurers: Cognition and the Economic
Analysis of Tort Law, in 4 CRITICS OF INSTITUTIONS: LAW AND ECONOMIcs 387 (Robin Paul
Malloy & Christopher K. Braun eds., 1995).
119. See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, The Reasonable Woman Standard: A Meta-Analytic Review of
Gender Differences in Perceptions of Sexual Harassment, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 33 (1998);
Margo Schlanger, Injured Women Before Common Law Courts, 1860-1930, 21 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 79 (1998).
120. See generally Paul Slovic et al., Violence Risk Assessment and Risk Communication: The
Effects of Using Actual Cases, Providing Instruction, and Employing Probability Versus Fre-
quency Formats, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 271 (2000).
121. See TAVRIs & ARONSON, supra note 44.
122. I have focused on the reasonable person standard, but the psychological phenomena de-
scribed may have similar implications for other standards, such as recklessness. See Geoffrey
Christopher Rapp, The Wreckage of Recklessness, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 111 (2008). Similar links
can be drawn between many different areas of psychological research and other areas of tort
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The research on apologies is but one recent example of the contri-
butions of psychology to the understanding of case settlement. Much
additional work in psychology has proven useful in shaping our under-
standing of the settlement of tort lawsuits. We have learned much
from psychology about persuasion and influence in negotiation;12 3 the
effects of how offers are framed; 24 the importance of the different
reference points on which negotiators might anchor; 25 the self-serving
ways in which parties and lawyers interpret case evidence; 126 the role
of regret in lawsuit settlement; 127 the importance of fairness; 12 8 the
role of power; 29 the psychology of options; 30 the role of reactive de-
law, including products liability, intentional torts, privacy torts, defamation, and others. See, e.g.,
John M. Darley & Charles W. Huff, Heightened Damage Assessment As a Result of the Intention-
ality of the Damage-Causing Act, 29 BRIT. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 181 (1990); Jon D. Hanson & Doug-
las A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112
HARV. L. REV. 1420 (1998); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seri-
ously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 (1999); James A. Hender-
son, Jr. & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Product-Related Risk and Cognitive Biases: The Shortcomings of
Enterprise Liability, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 213, 258 (2000); Korobkin & Ulen, supra
note 78; Howard A. Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41
UCLA L. REV. 1193 (1993); Evelyn Rosset, It's No Accident: Our Bias for Intentional Explana-
tions, 108 COGNITION 771 (2008).
123. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Principles of Influence in Negotiation, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 829
(2003); Donna Shestowsky, Psychology and Persuasion, in THE NEGOTIATOR'S FIELDBOOK 361
(Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Christopher Honeyman eds., 2006).
124. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI.
L. REV. 163 (2000).
125. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, Aspirations and Settlement, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3 (2002);
Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Opening Offers and Out-of-Court Settlement: A Little Moder-
ation May Not Go a Long Way, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 1, 18-19 (1994).
126. See, e.g., Linda Babcock et al., Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining, 85 AM. EcoN.
REV. 1337 (1995); Linda Babcock et al., Forming Beliefs About Adjudicated Outcomes: Percep-
tions of Risk and Reservation Values, 15 INr'L REV. L. & ECON. 289 (1995); Linda Babcock &
George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J.
ECON. PERSP. 109 (1997); George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and
Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135 (1993); Leigh Thompson & George Loewenstein,
Egocentric Interpretations of Fairness and Interpersonal Conflict, 51 ORGANIZAIONAL BEHAV.
& HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 176 (1992).
127. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sorry: The Regret Aversion Theory of Litiga-
tion Behavior, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 43.
128. See, e.g., Max H. Bazerman & Margaret A. Neale, The Role of Fairness Considerations
and Relationships in a Judgmental Perspective of Negotiation, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESO-
LUTION 86 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995); Max H. Bazerman et al., Perceptions of Fairness
in Interpersonal and Individual Choice Situations, 4 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. Sci. 39
(1995); George F. Loewenstein et al., Social Utility and Decision Making in Interpersonal Con-
texts, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 426 (1989); Nancy A. Welsh, Perceptions of Fairness
in Negotiation, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 753 (2003).
129. See, e.g., Joe C. Magee et al., Power, Propensity to Negotiate, and Moving First in Compet-
itive Interactions, 33 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 200 (2007).
130. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Panacea or Pandora's Box?: The Cost of Options in Negotiation,
88 IowA L. REV. 601 (2002).
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valuation;131 the role of interpersonal perception; 132 and the complica-
tions that difficulties in affective forecasting pose for settlement.
133
Much of the work on damages is also familiar and has focused on
the factors that influence decision makers who are asked to determine
damages. For example, psychologists have explored the implications
of assessing compensatory damages from an ex ante versus an ex post
perspective;134 the factors that underlie decision makers' awards for
different types of damages;135 the difficulty of translating pain and suf-
fering and punishment into dollar values; 136 the influence of anchors
provided by the media, attorney ad damnum requests for damages,
and other sources; 137 the extent to which fact finders are able to sepa-
131. See, e.g., Lee Ross & Andrew Ward, Psychological Barriers to Dispute Resolution, in 27
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 255, 270 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 1995).
132. See, e.g., Leigh Thompson & Reid Hastie, Social Perception in Negotiation, 47 ORGANI-
ZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 98 (1990).
133. See generally Timothy D. Wilson & Daniel T. Gilbert, Affective Forecasting, in 35 AD-
VANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 345 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 2003); Chris Guthrie &
David F. Sally, Miswanting, in THE NEGOTIATOR'S FIELDBOOK 277, 279-81 (Andrea Kupfer
Schneider & Christopher Honeyman eds., 2006). See also John Bronsteen et al., Hedonic Adap-
tation and the Settlement of Civil Lawsuits, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1516 (2008); Peter H. Huang,
Emotional Adaptation and Lawsuit Settlements, 108 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 50 (2008); Rick
Swedloff, Accounting for Happiness in Civil Settlements, 108 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 39 (2008).
134. See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and
Suffering Awards, 81 VA. L. REV. 1341 (1995).
135. See, e.g., EDIE GREENE & BRIAN H. BORNSTEIN, DETERMINING DAMAGES: THE Psy-
CHOLOGY OF JURY AWARDS (2003); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages:
Empirical Insights and Implications for Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 103 (2002); Roselle L. Wissler
et al., Decisionmaking About General Damages: A Comparison of Jurors, Judges, and Lawyers,
98 MICH. L. REV. 751 (1999); Roselle L. Wissler et al., Explaining "Pain and Suffering" Awards:
The Role of Injury Characteristics and Fault Attributions, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 181 (1997); see
also John M. Darley & Thane S. Pittman, The Psychology of Compensatory and Retributive
Justice, 7 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 324 (2003).
136. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition
and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071 (1997); Ivo Vlaev et al., The Price of Pain and the
Value of Suffering, 20 PSYCHOL. Sci. 309, 316 (2009) ("Our results do not necessarily imply that
the brain does not have stable representations of pain, but they do suggest that it cannot readily
translate such representations into monetary terms.").
137. See, e.g., Gretchen B. Chapman & Brian H. Bornstein, The More You Ask For, the More
You Get: Anchoring in Personal Injury Verdicts, 10 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 519, 522
(1996); Guthrie et al., supra note 65, at 802-03 (2000); Reid Hastie et al., Juror Judgments in
Civil Cases: Effects of Plaintiffs Requests and Plaintiffs Identity on Punitive Damage Awards, 23
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 445 (1999); Verlin B. Hinsz & Kristin E. Indahl, Assimilation to Anchors
for Damage Awards in a Mock Civil Trial, 25 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 991, 1005, 1010. 1013-15
(1995); John Malouff & Nicola S. Schutte, Shaping Juror Attitudes: Effects of Requesting Differ-
ent Damages Amounts in Personal Injury Trials, 129 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 491, 494 (1989); Jennifer
K. Robbennolt & Christina A. Studebaker, Anchoring in the Courtroom: The Effects of Caps on
Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 353, 359 (1999); Michael J. Saks et al., Reducing
Variability in Civil Jury Awards, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 243, 252 (1997).
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rate considerations of liability and damages; 38 the effect of the hind-
sight bias on damages awards; 1 39 and the "double-discounting" of
damages awards in cases involving comparative negligence. 140
Some recent work has focused less on fact finder determinations of
damages and has considered questions about the appropriate scope of
damages. For example, recent work has considered the implications
of counterfactual thinking for appropriate compensation: Should com-
pensation be paid for the heightened frustration and regret attendant
to nearly avoiding injury? Should compensation be paid for the harm
caused by a near miss? 141 Similar questions could be posed with re-
gard to recent findings that the experience of pain is worse when it is
intentionally inflicted than when it is not.142 Should greater compen-
sation be paid for the same injury when it is inflicted intentionally?
Other scholars have begun to debate the implications of the literature
on affective forecasting and hedonic adaptation for tort damage
awards. 143
138. See, e.g., Roselle L. Wissler et al., The Impact of Jury Instructions on the Fusion of Liabil-
ity and Compensatory Damages, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 125 (2001).
139. See, e.g., Hastie et al., supra note 73.
140. See, e.g., Douglas J. Zickafoose & Brian H. Bornstein, Double Discounting: The Effects
of Comparative Negligence on Mock Juror Decision Making, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 577 (1999)
(finding a tendency to award less in damages to a plaintiff who is negligent even when told that
the judge would reduce the award to account for the plaintiff's negligence).
141. See generally Hirsch & Mitchell, supra note 116. See also Robert K. Bothwell & Kermit
W. Duhon, Counterfactual Thinking and Plaintiff Compensation, 134 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 705
(1994); C. Neil Macrae, A Tale of Two Curries: Counterfactual Thinking and Accident-Related
Judgments, 18 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 84 (1992); Dale T. Miller & Cynthia Mc-
Farland, Counterfactual Thinking and Victim Compensation: A Test of Norm Theory, 12 PERSON-
ALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 513 (1986); Christopher W. Williams et al., The Role of
Counterfactual Thinking and Causal Attribution in Accident-Related Judgments, 26 J. APPLIED
SOC. PSYCHOL. 2100 (1996).
142. See Kurt Gray & Daniel M. Wegner, The Sting of Intentional Pain, 19 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1260
(2008).
143. See Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic Adaptation,
and Disability, 60 VAND. L. REv. 745 (2007); Rick Swedloff & Peter H. Huang, Tort Damages
and the New Science of Happiness, 85 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1354234; Cass R. Sunstein, Illusory Losses, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. S157 (2008); Peter A.
Ubel & George Loewenstein, Pain and Suffering Awards: They Shouldn't Be (Just) About Pain
and Suffering, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. S195 (2008).
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Psychologists have also long studied the counterfactual reasoning 44
that is at the heart of the but-for test of causation. 145 However, while
the counterfactual analysis is central to a consideration of causation,
causal attribution is not always, or not completely, driven by
counterfactual thinking.146 Psychologists know that people attribute
more causal importance to acts than to omissions; 14 7 to acts that are
consistent with people's pre-existing schemas about what factors typi-
cally cause particular injuries; 148 to acts that are otherwise morally
blameworthy; 49 and to dispositional factors more than to situational
factors, a phenomenon known as the fundamental attribution error.150
144. For reviews, see Neal J. Roese, Counterfactual Thinking, 121 PSYCHOL. BULL. 133 (1997);
Hirsch & Mitchell, supra note 116. See also Richard L. Wiener et al., Counterfactual Thinking in
Mock Juror Assessments of Negligence: A Preliminary Investigation, 12 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 89
(1994). For example, researchers have found predictable patterns in the ways in which people
counterfactually mutate events. See Roese, supra. Thus, while it is possible to alter a given sce-
nario in infinite ways, people tend to find it easier to mutate acts rather than omissions, abnor-
mal rather than normal antecedents, and controllable rather than uncontrollable antecedents. Id.
145. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm (Basic Principles) § 26
(Mar. 25, 2002) (Tentative Draft No. 2). In some instances, simply conducting the counterfactual
inquiry can be complicated by other psychological phenomena. See Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B.
Cohen, Informed Decision Making and the Law of Torts: The Myth of Justiciable Causation, 1988
U. ILL. L. REV. 607 (arguing that findings in psychology about people's neglect of base rate
information, difficulty in considering multiple risks simultaneously, and susceptibility to framing
and availability effects make it difficult-if not impossible-to assess causation in informed con-
sent medical malpractice cases); see also William C. Thompson, Psychological Issues in Informed
Consent, in 3 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: STUDIES ON THE FOUNDATION OF INFORMED
CONSENT 83 (1982).
146. See Barbara A. Spellman & David R. Mandel, When Possibility Informs Reality:
Counterfactual Thinking As a Cue to Causality, 8 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. ScI. 120
(1999). See generally EDWARD E. JONES, INTERPERSONAL PERCEPTION (1990); RICHARD Nis-
BETr & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT
(1980); KELLY G. SHAVER, THE ATTRIBUTION OF BLAME: CAUSALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND
BLAMEWORTHINESS (1985); BERNARD WEINER, JUDGMENTS OF RESPONSIBILITY: A FOUNDA-
TION FOR A THEORY OF SOCIAL CONDUCT (1995); Harold H. Kelley, The Processes of Causal
Attribution, 28 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 107 (1973); Mark Alicke, Culpable Causation, 63 J. PERSON-
ALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 368 (1992). See also Barbara A. Spellman, Crediting Causality, 126 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 323 (1997); Barbara A. Spellman & Alexandra Kincannon, The
Relation Between Counterfactual ("But For") and Causal Reasoning: Experimental Findings and
Implications for Jurors' Decisions, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 241 (2001).
147. See Jonathan Baron & Ilana Ritov, Reference Points and Omission Bias, 59 ORGANIZA-
TIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 475 (1994).
148. See Brian H. Bornstein & Michelle Rajki, Extra-Legal Factors and Product Liability: The
Influence of Mock Jurors' Demographic Characteristics and Intuitions About the Cause of an
Injury, 12 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 127 (1994); see also Allen J. Hart et al., Injuries, Prior Beliefs, and
Damage Awards, 15 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 63 (1997).
149. See Alicke, supra note 146. For example, people will more often find a speeding driver to
be a cause of an accident when that driver is speeding so that he can get home to hide his drugs
than when he is speeding so that he can get home to hide an anniversary present. Id. at 369-70.
150. See EDWARD E. JONES, INTERPERSONAL PERCEPTION 138-66 (1990); NISBETr & Ross,
supra note 146; Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the
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In addition, people expect to find consistency between the nature of
causes and their consequences. 15 1
Interesting work could be done to explore the ways in which and
the extent to which people make causal attributions that depart from a
straightforward but-for cause analysis. For example, psychologists
have found that in cases of multiple sufficient causes, people attribute
cause to both sources, even though the harm would still have occurred
in the absence of either source. 152 This lay intuition is consistent with
the exception to the but-for rule of causation, as embodied in the Re-
statement (Third) of Torts § 27.153 It would be instructive to explore
other lay intuitions about causal relationships and the extent to which
these intuitions are consistent or inconsistent with other facets of the
legal analysis-for example, the rules regarding the scope of liability
(proximate or legal cause) 154 or loss of chance. 155
Psychological findings can also be useful in understanding the rules
related to limited duties. For example, the rules relating to rescue
Attribution Process, in 10 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 173 (Leonard Berkowitz
ed., 1977).
151. Consistency is expected, for example, in terms of magnitude (big consequences are
thought to stem from big causes), complexity (complex outcomes are thought to stem from com-
plex causes), normality (normal outcomes result from normal causes, and abnormal outcomes
from abnormal causes), and valence (negative outcomes have negative causes, and positive out-
comes have positive causes). See NISBET-r & Ross, supra note 146; Damien L.H. Sim & Michael
W. Morris, Representativeness and Counterfactual Thinking: The Principle That Antecedent and
Outcome Correspond in Magnitude, 24 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 595 (1998).
152. See Spellman & Kincannon, supra note 146. There is also evidence that "psychologically,
attributions of preventability and causality are different. In attributing preventability, people
focus on controllable antecedents (e.g., choice of route, stopping at a yellow light); in attributing
causality, people focus on antecedents that general knowledge suggests would co-vary with, and
therefore predict, the outcome (e.g., drunk drivers)." Spellman & Mandel, supra note 146, at
123.
153. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm § 27 (Apr. 6, 2005) (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1) ("If multiple acts exist, each of which alone would have been a factual cause
... of the physical harm at the same time, each act is'regarded as a factual cause of the harm.").
154. For example, it would be interesting to explore how people reason about "trivial causes."
See, e.g., id. § 36 (addressing "trivial contributions to multiple sufficient causes"); Joseph Sanders
et al., The Insubstantiality of the "Substantial Factor" Test for Causation, 73 Mo. L. REV. 399
(2008); see also Joel T. Johnson & Jerome Drobny, Happening Soon and Happening Later: Tem-
poral Cues and Attributions of Liability, 8 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 209 (1987); Joel T.
Johnson & Jerome Drobny, Proximity Biases in the Attribution of Civil Liability, 48 J. PERSON-
ALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 283 (1985); Joel T. Johnson et al., Causal Primacy and Comparative
Fault: The Effect of Position in a Causal Chain on Judgments of Legal Responsibility, 15 PERSON-
ALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 161 (1989).
155. See Jonathan J. Koehler, Which Chance Was Lost? The Psychology of Damage Awards
Under the Loss of Chance Doctrine, in 2 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ECONOMIC DECISIONS: REASONS
AND CHOICES 211 (Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carrillo eds., 2004); John M. Darley et al., Liability
for Risk: Citizens' Perspectives on Liability for Creation of Risk and Loss of Chance (2nd Annual
Conf. on Empirical L. Studies, Working Paper Series, 2007), available at http://ssrn.coml
abstract=998641.
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might be enlightened by the psychology of omission bias-that acts
are perceived to be more blameworthy than omissions 56-or by the
psychology of bystander intervention. 157 A consideration of how peo-
ple engage in counterfactual thinking can also enlighten the rules re-
garding emotional harm and bystander recovery. 158
The range of psychological research areas with implications for tort
law and practice is significant, and goes beyond the literature on
heuristics and biases. A broad understanding of the ways in which
legal actors think and behave allows us to refine the assumptions un-
derlying the legal rules, to predict how the law will affect behavior, or
to improve the ways in which we evaluate behavior. Sometimes, the
findings from psychology have clear implications or suggest straight-
forward avenues for reform, but frequently the implications are more
complicated. Indeed, given the myriad ways in which the influences
on behavior can interact and the boundary conditions on the various
findings, reform efforts based on such findings should not be under-
taken lightly.' 59 Nonetheless, research findings in psychology have
provided a variety of valuable insights into, as well as variety of com-
plications for, the tort system. Grappling with the implications of
these findings for tort law can only enrich our understanding of the
law and its effects.
156. See Prentice & Koehler, supra note 115, at 590.
157. See, e.g., John M. Darley & Bibb Latand, Bystander Intervention in Emergencies: Diffu-
sion of Responsibility, 8 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 377 (1968); John M. Darley, By-
stander Phenomenon, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOLOGY 493 (Alan E. Kazdin ed., 2000).
158. See Hirsch & Mitchell, supra note 116 (discussing the implications of counterfactual rea-
soning for bystander cases). For example, Hirsch and Mitchell argue that counterfactual think-
ing-the "realization that 'a near miss may be as frightening as a direct hit' "--explains the zone
of danger rule. Id. (quoting Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 547 (1994)).
159. See Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behaviorism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of
the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907, 1936 (2002) ("If the policy
prescriptions drawn from legal decision theory are based on faulty assumptions, bad research, or
incomplete understandings of behavior, then unintended results may ensue following implemen-
tation of the suggested reforms and the intellectual integrity of the field may suffer.").
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